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Ergenekon, New Pacts, and the Decline
of the Turkish “Inner State”
ERSEL AYDINLI
Department of International Relations, Bilkent University
ABSTRACT This article looks at both the direct question of the Turkish military’s changing
role in Turkish politics as specifically reflected in its reaction to the Ergenekon investigation,
and more broadly at the recent face of pact-making in Turkey. It explores the nature of current
pacts with respect to Turkish civil-military relations, and questions whether these pacts may
actually be evidence of a deeper consolidation of Turkish democracy and the emergence of
a new Turkish State.
In democratization processes, the key question with respect to democratic pacts is not
their role in initiating democratic transitions but whether so-called “pacted tran-
sitions” are just another way of explaining the evolution of limited democracies.
While pacts have long been considered crucial in making transitions away from
authoritarian regimes,1 they have also included a sense of limitation—limiting the
scope of change and limiting the actors involved. While these have been considered
positive attributes, particularly the restricting of pact partners to moderates on both
sides,2 the narrowness aspect can also be seen as perhaps contributing to one of
the most criticized aspects of pacts, namely that they may prevent further democratic
consolidation by locking in existing privileges and potentially nondemocratic prac-
tices for certain people.3
This article looks therefore not only at the direct question of the Turkish military’s
changing role in Turkish politics as specifically reflected in its reaction to the Ergen-
ekon investigation, but more broadly at the recent face of pact-making in Turkey. It
explores the nature of current pacts in Turkish civil-military relations, and questions
whether these pacts may constitute a movement beyond the limited and restricting
pacts of early stages of democratic transition, and whether they may, in fact, be evi-
dence of pact making for deeper consolidation of Turkish democracy. First, however,
the following section turns back to events since the mid-1990s that seem to have
rendered it possible for a potentially new kind of pacts to be made and, ultimately,
for the launching of the Ergenekon investigation.
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From February 28, 1997 to Ergenekon
In February 1997, Turkey experienced an intriguingly new form of coup. The country
had experienced classic military interventions in 1960 and 1980, in which the military
took power into its own hands. In contrast, the so-called February 28 process was
more subtle, as absolutist4 members of the military, including commanders such as
Çevik Bir, tried to galvanize like-minded affiliates within the media, higher edu-
cation, the business chambers, unions, and even politicians,5 to block the existing
government from exercising power. In essence, the military encouraged and coordi-
nated a societal reaction against the Islamist Welfare Party-led government of
Necmettin Erbakan, leading to society-wide protests against the government. It
was within such a context that the military, during a National Security Council
meeting on February 28, 1997 presented the government with a list of measures
that the government should take. On this list were a number of items that would
have been virtual political suicide for the Welfare Party to comply with (e.g.
education reform requiring the extension of compulsory education for an additional
three years, and thus requiring the closure of the middle three grades of the prayer
leader and preacher schools). Unable to go along with or stand up against the
concerted pressure in question, Erbakan was essentially forced to step down.
A new government, one more palatable for the military, came to power. This indirect
and obviously more subtle style of intervention led some journalists to label that
intervention as a post-modern coup.
With respect to the unfavorable effects of the intervention of February 28, two
things become clear. First, the heretofore most trusted Turkish institution, the mili-
tary, began to lose trust among significant portions of the society, leading to an unpre-
cedented questioning of the military’s motivations and actions vis-à-vis Turkish
society and politics.6 Secondly, the military was exposed as no longer being the
homogeneous institution it had been considered during and after the 1980 coup.
February 28’s revealing of non-hierarchical initiatives from within the military, the
excessive visibility of the army’s number-two general in the Office of the General
Staff, Çevik Bir, showed that the army was being pushed for such action by a
strong clique within the ranks and that there was in fact a heterogeneity within the
military.
Some six years after the February 28 process, this particular tendency increasingly
was displayed in different ways, and ultimately led to unprecedented changes both in
perceptions of the military and its position in Turkish politics and society as well as
within the relations between the military and the civilian government. Signs of the
military’s dividedness could be first discerned from a dual discourse evident in the
military leadership. In May 2003, Hilmi Özkök, then Chief of General Staff,
openly described the military’s relationship with the Islamist-leaning Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government as harmonious,7 but at the same time,
made public declarations about the threat of regressive Islam and assured the
public that the Turkish Armed Forces would monitor any such developments with































in the military were in favor of cooperating with the civilian government, but were far
from being in a position that would allow them to ignore the military’s absolutist
circles.
Despite the top leadership’s gradualist approach of cautious accommodation with
the civilians and discursive balancing to calm absolutist concerns, reactions by abso-
lutist circles did emerge from time to time. One example reflecting old-style absolutist
practices occurred on November 9, 2005 in the far Eastern town of Şemdinli, when two
junior officers were caught in connection with the bombing of a pro-PKK bookstore.8
Rather than immediately condemning such behavior, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, who
would soon thereafter replace Özkök as Chief of General Staff, declared that he
knew one of the suspects and said that he was a “good boy.”9 The media and some
civil society groups criticized Büyükanıt, stating that his comments would influence
the judicial process,10 and as a consequence, the impartiality of military jurisdiction
would come under serious doubt.
With societal questioning of the military’s involvement in improper behavior on
the rise, in early May 2006, the offices of Cumhuriyet, Turkey’s leading secularist
newspaper, were bombed three times.11 Later that month, the Council of State (Danış-
tay) was also attacked and a senior judge was shot dead and four others injured.12 In
this case, the suspect, Alparslan Aslan, stated that his action stemmed from anger over
a Danıştay ruling forbidding teachers’ wearing of headscarves in public schools.13
The common assumption was that these were acts of radical Islamists who were
angered by the newspaper’s staunch secularist political stance. These two events
also came to reveal evidence of a divide within the military, and eventually helped
lower societal trust in the military. Both the bombings and the shooting were later
linked to the Ergenekon case, with the judicial claim that absolutist circles had alleg-
edly either coordinated these attacks or at minimum had tried to use them for persuad-
ing people that the country was facing an Islamist-based reaction or even a potential
counter-republican revolutionary mobilization. The hope was that a widespread
assumption of such a mobilization would have strengthened the absolutist wing of
the military by discrediting the Islamist government and, by association, the gradual-
ists in the military who were cooperating with them.
A potential flashpoint for inciting tensions between the military and civilian leader-
ships came about in spring 2007. With the term of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer
drawing to a close, the AKP-dominated parliament would soon be electing the new
president, and all expectations were that a person with an Islamist past and
agenda—presumably Prime Minister Erdoğan himself—would be chosen. Due to
the presidency’s critical role in matters of national security and its powers to elect
members to the Constitutional Court since 1982, presidential elections since then
have always been of tremendous importance to the Turkish Armed Forces, and
have generally swung toward someone sympathetic to the hard realm. Obviously con-
cerned about possibly losing this critical position, the absolutist circles, in particular
retired officers, cooperated with certain societal organizations in putting together
mass demonstrations against the AKP government and its presumed standing regard-
ing the presidential election. Civil society organizations such as the Atatürkçü






























Düşünce Derneği (Atatürkist Thought Association) and Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme
Derneği (Association in Support of Contemporary Life), organized a massive demon-
stration in Ankara’s Tandoğan Square on April 14, 2007,14 with the aim of protecting
Republican values (e.g. secularism) and of protesting Erdoğan’s potential candidacy.
Predominant among the protesters were slogans in favor of the military, such as
“Orduya uzanan eller kırılsın” (Down with the hands that encroach on the army),
“Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz” (We are soldiers of Mustafa Kemal), and “En
büyük asker bizim asker” (The greatest military is our military).15
Ultimately on April 24, 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan nominated not himself, but
foreign minister Abdullah Gül, as the AKP candidate for president. Gül’s candidacy
was essentially as controversial as Erdoğan’s would have been, due to Gül’s past
involvement with two banned Islamic political parties. On April 27, 2007, with oppo-
sition parties protesting and only 353 parliamentarians present, the AKP failed to
achieve a controversial quorum of 367 necessary to elect Gül as president. At that
point an interesting event occurred, again ultimately revealing the divide in the mili-
tary and contributing to additional skepticism among segments of Turkish society
about the military’s role in Turkish politics. Late in the evening on the day of the
vote, the Turkish Armed Forces released a statement on the official website of the
General Staff, stating that “. . . when needed, the Turkish military will declare its pos-
ition clearly and precisely . . . ,” essentially putting forth that the military was ready to
intervene in the political process if the Islamist challenge was not contained.16 While
the goal appeared to be to send a reminder of the autonomy of the hard realm and
inner state,17 the style and indirectness brought back memories of the February 28
process, and led to the whole event later being branded by critics as an e-coup
attempt.18 Primarily, the controversial e-memorandum provides more evidence of
the internal divide raging at the time. Büyükanıt, the presumed author of the state-
ment, rarely referred to it, and questions began to rise about who the actual author
was, who authorized it, and under what kind of circumstances it was prepared. Per-
sonal accounts of those closely linked to the military leadership tell similar stories,
that the e-memorandum was put together in a rushed manner, at late hours, and
under the influence of pressure by absolutist circles. Ultimately, the e-memorandum
did not lead to any actual changes in terms of the results of the presidential election,
nor was it predictive of Büyükanıt’s subsequent cooperative efforts with the civilians.
The e-memorandum appears to have been more intended therefore to satisfy absolu-
tist demands within the military, and thus reflects the dual discourse that was necess-
ary to establish a balance between the struggling absolutist and gradualist agendas.
Whatever the intended purpose of the e-memorandum, it too contributed to the
military’s diminishing image. The government seized the opportunity of having
been victimized by the military via the e-coup attempt, and promptly called for elec-
tions, in a sense asking the society to judge its performance and the military’s inter-
vention discourse. The AKP gained 46.6 percent of the votes—a remarkable result by
Turkish electoral standards—and fairly concrete evidence of the Turkish society
demonstrating its growing opposition to the military’s involvement in politics. The































of society as an excessive and inappropriate move. This way a powerful message was
sent to the absolutist wing of the Turkish military, and it seemed to strengthen the
hand of the gradualists. Following the election, Büyükanıt’s and other force comman-
ders’ public attitudes and statements on Abdullah Gül’s ultimate election to the pre-
sidential post were relatively cooperative.19
With the absolutist agenda increasingly being discredited, the previously shy gra-
dualists became more courageous. While the Turkish Armed Forces retained its pos-
ition with respect to various symbolic issues such as the ban on headscarf in the
public space, on most major issues they agreed to work together with a lawfully
elected president whose legitimacy no longer seemed questionable.20 Büyükanıt’s
speeches reveal not only his own transformation from an apparent absolutist to
more of a gradualist,21 but a shift in the internal divide toward the gradualists; he
often spoke of the contemporary era as one of change. He emphasized that change
was unavoidable and, therefore, leaders must adopt a strategy of controlled
change.22 This reference to the acceptance of change, an apparent cautious call to
a civilianization of the armed forces, albeit in a controlled manner, was a nod to
the gradualist way of thinking at the expense of the absolutist agenda. It is arguably
Büyükanıt’s transforming image from, initially, an apparent absolutist, to later on a
more accommodative gradualist, that most fully symbolizes the beginning of the
downfall of the absolutist agenda following its peak with the February 28 process.
The subsequent continued erosion of the absolutist agenda, combined with the
overwhelming election results of a political elite which had the know-how and
self-confidence to deal with an internally transforming military, would lead to the
most controversial yet important legal case trying to eradicate the absolutist political
agenda and elements from the Turkish political system—Ergenekon.
The Divide in Their Own Words
Before turning to the details of the actual Ergenekon case itself, it is important to note
that more recent revelations about the internal dynamics of the military during the
post-February 28 process years provide further evidence of the seriousness of the div-
isions within the military, beyond the dualistic discourse described above. In March
2007, the weekly journal Nokta published the diaries of retired Navy Commander
Admiral Özden Örnek. The diaries revealed that in 2004, some top Turkish comman-
ders were plotting a coup d’état.23 The mastermind of the plot was presented as Şener
Eruygur, retired Commander General of the Gendarmerie and a key suspect in the
Ergenekon investigation. Örnek first denied that the diaries were his, and filed a
law-suit against the journal.24 One year later, in the course of the subsequent inves-
tigations, proof was provided that the diaries were in fact taken from Örnek’s personal
computer.25 These diaries constituted the backbone of the second Ergenekon indict-
ment, filed on March 10, 2009.
The Coup Diaries illustrated openly for the first time the divide within the military
leadership. According to the diaries, while Şener Eruygur and İbrahim Fırtına, then
Air Force Commander, both thought that a military intervention was necessary,






























Hilmi Özkök, then Chief of General Staff, actively blocked such a move. The diaries
also referred to Yaşar Büyükanıt, then Vice Chief of General Staff, and İlker Başbuğ,
Commander of the First Army, as being on Özkök’s side—namely the gradualist
camp. It is of course of no small significance that these two generals succeeded
Özkök as the next two Chiefs of General Staff.
Ultimately, the diaries revealed not only the divide but also the serious philosophi-
cal differences that the two camps represented. The author of the diaries, Admiral
Örnek himself, while sharing fellow absolutist commanders’ worries about the
threats secularism faced, nevertheless had doubts about whether they might not
have gone too far in their toying with the idea of military intervention. Along with
the Commander of the Armed Forces, Aytaç Yalman, Özden felt that the comman-
ders should work with Özkök, no matter how willing he appeared (excessively so
to their minds) to cooperate with the civilians. Örnek wrote that he was shocked
by the irrationality and stubbornness of his colleague Eruygur in particular, and
stressed that they had to remain within the rule of law. The diaries revealed that
the crux of the absolutist/gradualist divide was based on the fundamental philosophi-
cal question of whether civilians should be given the chance to show that they can
successfully deal with the problems the country faces or whether they should be
removed from power and taught a lesson in how to properly conduct themselves in
politics. Eruygur would later go on to lose the support of all but the most absolutist
of generals and plan a coup by himself (the failed Eldiven [glove] Plan),26 and the
Ergenekon investigations would follow to attempt to cleanse not only the military
but the entire system of absolutist groups.
Ergenekon Waves
The Ergenekon case, which began as a small-scale operation by the Istanbul police
department, was triggered by an anonymous phone call by someone who stated
that explosives were being stored in a house in the Ümraniye district of Istanbul.
The ensuing operation uncovered 27 hand grenades, some of which, it was revealed,
had been produced by the Turkish state-owned armaments factory (MKEK). Soon
after, there emerged in the press arguments that the serial numbers on the MKEK-
produced grenades matched the ones used in earlier bombings of Cumhuriyet news-
paper offices,27 the implication being that the bombings had been false flag operations
by ultranationalist secularists aimed at discrediting Islamist groups.28 The investi-
gations that followed led to the arrest, among others, of a retired army major Muzaffer
Tekin, who was also associated with Alparslan Aslan, the Council of State shooter.
On June 26, 2007, a second police raid discovered weapons and explosives in the
house of another retired army major, Fikret Emek.29 These two raids were later
called the first and second waves of the Ergenekon operation.
On January 21, 2008, the third Ergenekon wave swept up several more prominent
figures: retired Brigadier General Veli Küçük, retired Colonel and head of an
ultranationalist group—Kuvva-yı Milliye—Fikri Karadağ, retired Captain Mehmet































Sevgi Erenerol, spokesperson of the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate, Susurluk case
convict Sami Hoştan, mafia leaders Sedat Peker and Ali Yasak (known as Drej
Ali), and journalist and writer Ümit Oğuztan.30 Linking these individuals was their
staunchly secularist and nationalist stance on politics. Shortly thereafter, in February,
two academics with equally secularist and nationalist views, Emin Gürses and Ümit
Sayın, were also arrested.31 Later on, prominent figures like Doğu Perinçek, leader of
the Workers’ Party, Kemal Alemdaroğlu, former rector of Istanbul University, and
İlhan Selçuk, chief columnist of Cumhuriyet were detained.32
In July 2008, the Ergenekon operations reached a new phase, as even higher
ranking figures became involved. The sixth wave saw the detaining of former Com-
mander of the Gendarmerie, General Şener Eruygur, former Commander of the First
Army, General Hurşit Tolon, Chairman of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, Sinan
Aygün, and Ankara representative of Cumhuriyet, columnist Mustafa Balbay.
Eruygur and Tolon were ultimately arrested.33
On July 14, 2008, the first indictment was prepared by the Istanbul Prosecutor’s
Office, and submitted to the Thirteenth Branch of the Istanbul Court for Serious
Crimes.34 The document contained 2,455 pages, and included indictments for the
detainees from the first five waves. The indictment formally charged 86 suspects
with “membership in an armed terrorist organization,” “attempting to overthrow
the government of the Turkish Republic by use of violence and coercion,” “inciting
people to armed rebellion against the government of the Turkish Republic,”
“encouraging the military to insubordination” and “inciting people to hatred and
enmity.”35 It further stated that the members of Ergenekon recognize their group
as an embodiment of the “inner state,” and see it as acting on behalf of the nation
and the state.
At the time of writing (June 2010) several waves have passed, scores of people
have been detained, and three indictments have been submitted to the court. While
the early waves targeted primarily public figures in the media, academia and civil
society organizations, subsequent waves have focused primarily on retired and com-
missioned army officers—arresting a few, detaining others, and, most recently,
calling in for questioning several four star generals, and the calling in of Hilmi
Özkök for information he might have been witness to during his tenure as Chief of
General Staff.36
The various waves of arrests and the apparent heterogeneity of the goals of the
various groups present a very complex picture. An outlining of the categories of
goals may help, however, to better understand the transforming nature of civil-mili-
tary relations in Turkey. In the Ergenekon case, four different goals seem to have
been adopted by four different groups. The first group consists largely of retired
army officers who still seem to be in their pre-retirement mode of fighting for the
integrity of the country. Since many of these figures were once involved in
counter-terrorism, they appear to see themselves as undercover warriors in an
ongoing war against enemies of the state and, therefore, allegedly, have gone so
far as to store weaponry and ammunition for the purpose of getting involved in
illegal secret operations. The second group consists mainly of people who have






























been vocal ideologues of an absolutist agenda based on isolationism, full indepen-
dence, and radical nationalism, and thus the building up of a survivalist psychology
of constant fear of threats to the country and its founding ideology. This group
includes primarily people from academia and non-governmental organizations. The
third group has a more mafia-like image, and includes those individuals and
members of networks that seek legitimacy for themselves by entering into some
kind of cooperation (ad hoc or more permanent) with the first group of retired military
or security officers again in the name of saving the country. Under that mantle, they
tend to expect political and state protection for their underground activities. Finally,
the fourth group consists of elements and networks embedded within the security
sector, but primarily within the military’s commanding officer circles, and who are
sometimes involved in ad hoc or—allegedly—organized coalitions with the first
three groups and who design and provoke societal upheavals and mobilization,
with the ultimate aim of conspiring, planning, and threatening or even attempting a
governmental takeover. This is the group or force which, at the end, has constituted
the primary driving force behind the absolutist presence in the Turkish hard realm—
the so-called Turkish inner state. Moreover, this is the group whose destiny deeply
affects the structure of civil-military relations in Turkey. Subordination or removal
of this group, more than any of the others, will allow the gradualists to complete
their mission of putting the military under civilian control.
The Ergenekon case, despite its controversy and faults, has succeeded in shedding
light on allegedly illegal activities of these groups and their relationships, and the
resulting coup or intervention potential that emerges out of them. As a result, the
need for a major transformation with respect to the role the Turkish military plays
in politics and society, both psychologically and institutionally, has come to be
widely accepted.
Pacts between the Gradualist Hard Realm and Soft Realm Elements
The divide within the military and the aforementioned increasing acceptance of the
need for restructuring the military’s place in Turkish politics have made it possible
for the continuing growth of informal and implicit pacts among gradualists on all
sides within the Turkish political system. The gradualists—who seem to be the
rising force in the military—have clearly been playing a crucial role in the revolution-
ary transformations taking place in Turkish civil-military relations. On the one hand,
coup plans have not materialized mostly because the gradualists, by refusing to
cooperate with the absolutist coup planners, have blocked such an attempt. On the
other hand, the Ergenekon operation itself has materialized and continued due to
the gradualists’ informal and formal cooperation with the soft realm—a cooperation
apparent in their failure to react negatively to the arrests of retired and serving offi-
cers, and their willingness to remain respectful of the judicial process.
One example of this subtle cooperation was the so-called Cosmic Room incident.
In the aftermath of an alleged assassination attempt of Deputy Prime Minister Bülent































Room, a storage facility for the military’s elite Special Forces’ top secret docu-
ments.37 Prosecutors arriving at the so-called Mobilization Inspection Board at
General Staff Headquarters were initially turned away by the unit responsible for
guarding the archives, referring to the legal code concerning the Cosmic Room,38
which states that only an authorized judge can enter and take notes.39 Although in
previous years it would not have been possible for any judge or prosecutor to even
try to have this code enforced, in this case, a civil judge was allowed by the military
to enter the Cosmic Room, and continue his search for evidence for fourteen full days.
A behind the scenes collaboration of the soft realm and the gradualist elements
within the hard realm paved the way for this judicial process to move forward and
allow access to the Cosmic Room. At the time, Chief of General Staff Başbuğ and
Prime Minister Erdoğan met and discussed this particular development.40 Başbuğ
expressed the military’s determination to respect the judicial process—indicating
the top military leadership’s willingness to be cooperative for prosecuting any
illegal activity within its ranks. For his part, Erdoğan assured him that no legal mili-
tary secrets stored in the archives would be compromised. Overall, the incident of the
Cosmic Room revealed that the Turkish military leadership was not going to openly
resist the investigation—a sign of accommodation and cooperation that would have
been unimaginable a decade earlier.
This cooperation faced a powerful test when several four-star generals were inter-
rogated in relation to what came to be known as the Balyoz [Sledgehammer] Coup
Plan. The allegations were based on documents published in the daily newspaper
Taraf on January 20, 2010. According to the news item, a detailed coup preparation
had been made by the then First Army Commander, General Çetin Doğan.41 The
alleged coup preparation plot was said to have been discussed on March 4–5,
2003 in the First Army Headquarters in Istanbul as the most probable dangerous scen-
ario, as part of a regular war games simulation attended by 29 generals and 133 offi-
cers. The plan included the bombing of two mosques and the bringing down of a
Turkish jet, events projected to bring about martial law and the formation of a military
cabinet. After some sharply worded critical statements by AKP leaders such as
Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, Prime Minister Erdoğan provided a calmer offi-
cial reaction, making a sports-related analogy that he and the Chief of General Staff
were “passing the ball to each other,”42 implying that the soft realm and the Turkish
military were working together on this issue. Later, the presence of a report signed by
Başbuğ was revealed; in the report, it was stated that the remarks made by Çetin
Doğan during the war games seminar were beyond the limits set for it by the Land
Forces Command in Ankara, thus implying that the High Command had disowned
the rogue elements, and further implied a kind of ad hoc cooperation with the political
authority of the soft realm.
Conclusion
Despite all the managerial wrongdoings of Ergenekon and their at times tragic out-
comes (e.g. the death in prison of a terminally ill detainee who was never






























convicted),43 the case itself, the division in the military that it has helped to further
reveal, and the informal pacts that have continued to emerge throughout the investi-
gation, have nevertheless helped to contribute to arguably irreversible changes in the
mindset of critical segments of the Turkish elite and society with respect to the role of
the army in a liberal democracy. These changes are keys not just to understanding
why the military has acquiesced with the Ergenekon investigation, but also to grasp-
ing the new pattern of civil-military relations in Turkey.
As a whole, large segments of Turkish elite and society, from large and small busi-
nesspeople, lay people and intellectuals, to liberals and nationalists, appear now
united in their condemnation of the unaccountable, invisible “inner state”—the
realm of the absolutist circles. In light of the Ergenekon investigation, those absolu-
tists who might still be willing or courageous enough to attempt a military interven-
tion are now more likely to be deterred by the possibility of an eventual indictment
and prosecution. Similarly, those remaining state or societal institutions (e.g. univer-
sities, the military, the judiciary, the police, NGOs), which harbor absolutist elements
and might be willing to take part in actions with the deliberate intention of inciting a
military takeover, would likely have second thoughts.
There appears to have been a change in the public mindset, one signaling entry into
an era in which military takeovers may no longer be feasible or even desired. This
informal normative turn in the mindset of many is likely to become consolidated
in the formal sphere, as legislation has been introduced to ensure democratic govern-
ance and civilian control of the military. Proposed constitutional amendments, which
have been passed by the parliament and are scheduled to be voted on in a public refer-
endum, are the main pillars of this formal threshold. The proposal includes amend-
ments guaranteeing the privacy of personal information, making closure of
political parties difficult, giving appeal rights to military officers who have lost
their jobs due to High Military Council decisions, limiting the sphere of military jur-
isdiction to military offences only, and reforming the Constitutional Court by
empowering the Turkish Grand National Assembly to appoint four of the court
members and reducing the number of military court members from two to one.
Most importantly, the proposed amendments will guarantee more civilian jurisdiction
over the military by designating greater independence to juridical institutions in the
election of members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors. If
this formal threshold is passed, it will both help to consolidate civilian accountability
on the one hand and to reduce the military’s autonomy on the other.
The Turkish military’s stand and activities during the February 28 process not only
laid bare the flawed, undemocratic nature in the military’s engagement with the
Turkish political system, but also revealed to the public at large a carefully hidden
internal divide in the military. The exposing of these flaws, added to the learned
experiences of the civilian politicians from past coups and attempted interventions,
helped create an environment in which formal and informal pacts were struck, in
order to permanently revise the role of the military in the Turkish political system
in a more democratic manner. In fact, the Ergenekon case, with its aim of eliminating































became possible within this new environment and due to these pacts. Throughout the
gradual post-February 28 pact-building process and the Ergenekon investigation, the
gradualists within the military leadership have managed to move to the forefront of
the restructuring process of the Turkish state, cooperating with the civilians in
order to negotiate a proper placing of the military in a liberal democracy.
Despite the criticisms of pacts in the democratic transition literature in recent years,
the Turkish case seems to indicate that pacts can evolve into more sophisticated,
diverse, and progressive formulations, which do not necessarily prohibit further
democratic transformation. By moving beyond the old style pacts, the consolidation
of democracy may be possible. In the Turkish case, early pacts between the civilians
and the military were indeed reached to form a tutelary regime in which the civilians
could be satisfied with their realm, but the absolutists within the hard realm would call
the ultimate shots. Events of the last two decades have shown, however, that both
parties in this original pact have diversified, evolved, and gained in experience.
Most important has been the evolution and diversification within the hard realm.
The maturing of this division—which became increasingly exposed after the
February 28 process—made possible the formulating of new pacts for a true demo-
cratic consolidation in Turkey. This new era of pacts seems to be one of multiplicity,
in which the actors are numerous, heterogeneous and evolving—just like the new
face of Turkey itself, a new Turkey in which the state does not own the society,
but society, with all its competing elements and actors, may very well own the state.
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9. Hürriyet, “Büyükanıt röportajının tam metni,” December 23, 2005.
10. Akşam, “Büyükanıt sözleriyle yargıyı etkiledi”; Hürriyet, “Komisyondan Büyükanıt’a Şemdinli
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30. Milliyet, “Büyük Operasyon,” January 23, 2008.
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